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Around the world, the humvee, or HMMWV (M998, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle), has been the standard for U.S. Armed Services’ ground transportation since 1985. However, even the up-armored version of the HMMWV has proven less than effective in the case of an improvised explosive device (IEDs) attack. Though the HMMWV was a good solution to the threat of small arms fire during WWII, when mines accounted for five percent of casualties, today’s Servicemen serve on a battlefield where IEDs account for 42 percent of the 4,141 American causalities. Therefore, beginning now, the summer of 2008, America’s sons and daughters are kept safe with the IED solution—the MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected).

My team completed driver’s training on the MRAP today, as it will be our primary transportation for the next 12 months. Our general reaction is awe of its design and a much welcomed sense of security.

The MRAP, approximately the size of a trash truck, towers over other vehicles. It weighs approximately 40,000 pounds, compared to the HMMWV at about 9,000. It has a maximum capacity of 10 personnel, compared to the HMMWV at 4. The vehicle is so large that only two vehicles in the Army’s fleet are capable of towing it. The tires are run flat, and the seatbelts are a four-point harness similar to a baby’s car seat. In short, of the at least 300 attacks on MRAPs, none have resulted in American casualties.

The security of the MRAP derives from its design, which deflects the blast of a mine away from its interior with a V-shaped hull. Upon direct IED attack, photographs show the a fully intact hull with its engine, wheels, axels and externatl equipment no where in sight. The confusing aspect of the MRAP is that five manufactorers produced these vehicles for the Army and Marine Corps, and the five variations do not look exactly alike or have the exact same features. For example, the Caiman MRAP is very spacious and sports the rough look typical of military vehicles. On the other hand, the MaxxPro MRAP has less cabin space, but looks and feels like a modern vehicle with power mirrors, as its manufactorer based it off a Caterpillar truck. However, all MRAP share the ultimate goal of security.

The outfitting of the MRAP marks a sharp shift in Army training and mentality. The old adage: speed equals security. Today, with the MRAP: the MRAP equals security. Its best defense is its ability to take a hit.

As thankful as our team is for the MRAP, it does have its drawbacks. First, cost (about $700,000 each with radios, anti-IED jammers and tracking devices). Second, weight and size of an MRAP limits its mobility off roads, in urban areas, and over bridges. Not only will a MRAP roll over if it takes a turn faster than 12 mph, but videos are available on youtube of the MRAP toppling bridges and roads giving out underneath them, causing them to roll over. Rollovers have resulted in serveral American casualties, as internal equipment that was not properly tied down became projectiles. While some blame the Iraqi infrastructure, the truth is that many bridges in the U.S. could not handle 40,000 pounds, much less a convoy of them. The difference is that bridges in the U.S. are marked with maximum capacity and height. That leads to the next limitation. At 17 feet tall, MRAPs have run into power lines, resulting in at least two American casualties. Lastly, the MRAPs size results in restrictions on their transport. Air transportation is financially inefficient, as the cost is about $750,000 per vehicle. In comparison, transportation via sea costs approximately $13,000 per vehicle but takes four weeks for the vehicle to arrive.

Mindful of the risk of rollovers, my team focuses on added security. We’ve heard estimates that the use of the MRAP could reduce the casualties in Iraq due to IED attacks by as much as 80 percent. In practice, however, the MRAP has a perfect trackrecord in casualties from IEDs—worth the cautious driving and every penny.

Rich Connaroe
Captain, U.S. Army
RICHARD.CONNAROE@US.ARMY.MIL

The thoughts and opinions in this article are that of the author alone and are not meant to represent the U.S. military. Any errors contained therein are that of the author.