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This column is the first in a series that explains some of the differences between the U.S. and Iraqi Armies.  Breaks occur in order to break up length.

The broad differences between any two armies are how they are equipped, their levels of training, and the demeanor and competency of their Soldiers.  The U.S. and Iraqi Armies differ along these lines in obvious and in less visible ways.

U.S. forces frequently notice that the Iraqi Army is increasingly capable of planning and executing missions on their own without any aid from the U.S.  However, a major hurdle in the Iraqi Army becoming fully independent is logistics:  fuel, food, water, bullets, vehicle maintenance.

The Iraqi Army was forced by necessity into forming and building while simultaneously fighting and succeeding in combat.  Their supply system, quite simply, struggles to keep up the pace with the maneuver units and increase sustainment as the Army grows.

Therefore, the Iraqi Soldiers often times struggle to make due with the supplies that they have.  Mechanics may have to wait to get parts to fix vehicles or units may have to buy parts on the local economy out of pocket.  Likewise, ammunition is infrequently available to use at marksmanship ranges, as the ammunition is instead used to endure combat missions.

The lack of training ammunition is actually of little hindrance, as the Iraqi Army does not have the same stress on training as the U.S. Army.  In the U.S. Army, we will repeat drills over and over to the point of muscle memory.  American sergeants preach that there is never too much training, especially the perishable skills used during combat.

The Iraqi Army puts much less stress on training.  To be fair, the Iraqis are constantly worried about real-world situations to become to absorbed in training scenarios and plans for hypothetical missions.  Their top priority in between combat missions is not to conduct training but instead to prepare for the next mission.

After all, conducting missions yields results:  found weapons caches, detainees and arrests on warrants.  Repetitive training might make for a better army, but it does not show tangible, immediate results.

Therefore, the visible Iraqi Army includes Soldiers that could benefit from more training and more readily available supplies.